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Abstract 
       
This paper examines the impact of public infrastructure on private capital formation in three 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa: Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. The first part highlights 
various channels through which public infrastructure may affect private investment. The second part 
describes our empirical framework, which is based on a VAR model that accounts for flows and 
(quality-adjusted) stocks of public infrastructure, private investment, as well as changes in output, 
private sector credit, and the real exchange rate. We propose two aggregate measures of the quality 
of public infrastructure and use principal components to derive a composite indicator. The impulse 
response analysis suggests that public infrastructure has both "flow" and "stock" effects on private 
investment in Egypt, but only a "stock" effect in Jordan and Tunisia. But these effects are small and 
short-lived, reflecting the unfavorable environment for private investment in our sample of countries. 
Reducing unproductive public capital expenditure and improving quality must be accompanied by 
reforms aimed at limiting the investment to infrastructure capital that crowds in the private sector.  At 
the same time, other improvements to the environment in which domestic investment operates are 
crucial to stimulate growth and job creation in the region. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the poor growth and employment 
performance of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is primarily due to 
the “slow, uneven and hesitant pace” of structural reforms launched in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (see World Bank (2003a) and Richards and Waterbury (1996)).
1 In 
particular, governments in the region continue to dominate most economies, with 
pervasive involvement in production, labor markets, banking systems, and social 
services. Despite efforts to reduce their size, the share of MENA’s public sectors in 
output and employment still exceeds the average for developing and industrialized 
countries. In addition to the size and scope of government intervention, private sector 
development in the region continues to be stifled by limited progress in building 
market-oriented institutions and in integrating the region into the world economy (see 
World Bank (2003b)). As a result, the economic recovery of the 1990s was weak, 
labor productivity remained low, and unemployment rates continued to increase. 
 
The absence of dynamic private sectors in MENA’s economies has been 
especially felt in the area of investment. Observers in the early 1990s had taken the 
view that the public sector has “over invested” and that public investment competes, 
rather than fosters, private investment (see Page (1998) and World Bank (1995)). But 
the decline in public investment rates was not always compensated by a rise in 
private investment. As a result, capital accumulation rates on a per worker basis 
stagnated in the past two decades (see Nabli and Keller (2002)). Indeed, with the 
exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA has the lowest private investment ratios 
among developing regions. Moreover, in countries where public investment levels 
remained high, the productivity of capital was limited.
 The very nature of the network 
utilities that were built to provide infrastructure services (vertically and horizontally 
integrated state monopolies) often resulted in weak delivery of services such as 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2004) for a review of employment and growth outcomes in the 1990s and 
their links to trends in physical and human capital accumulation. Elbadawi (2004) emphasized the role 
of conflict and instability whereas Hakura (2004) found that excessive government intervention and 
poor institutions were key factors hampering growth.   4
electricity, natural gas, telecommunications, railroads, and water supply. Common 
problems included low productivity, high costs, bad quality, insufficient revenue, and 
shortfalls in maintenance spending (see World Bank (1994) and Kessides (2004)). 
The low productivity of public investment is apparent in recent growth accounting 
exercises showing that contribution of physical capital accumulation to growth in 
MENA countries has declined over time, despite the fact that there has been no 




The extent to which public investment especially in infrastructure complements or 
crowds out private investment and the role of quantity versus quality in the 
productivity of public investment in MENA remain largely unknown. To date, there 
have been few empirical studies focusing on these issues in the region (see 
Appendix A for a review of studies linking public investment to private capital 
formation and growth in developing countries). In an early paper on Egypt, for 
instance, Shafik (1992) found that public investment tends to crowd out private 
investment through its effect on credit markets, and to crowd it in through investment 
in infrastructure. Everhart and Sumlinski (2001), using panel regression techniques 
and a proxy for the quality of public investment, find no significant effect of public 
investment on private investment in MENA. Dhumale (2000), using a model that 
accounts for credit to the private sector and the accelerator effect, finds that public 
investment in infrastructure appeared to have a crowding out effect in oil-exporting 
countries, and a crowding-in effect in the non oil-exporting countries. Mansouri (2004) 
finds that public capital had a positive effect on private investment in Morocco.  
 
However, existing studies are lacking in at least three respects. First, they 
seldom make a clear distinction between the flow effect of public investment, and the 
stock effect of public capital. But this is crucial, given that the transmission channels 
                                                 
2 The same observation applies to the growth in total factor productivity, which has been either 
negative or below international levels since the 1980s (Nabli and Keller (2002)). The efficiency of 
public spending on education has also been low, limiting the contribution of advances in educational 
attainment in the region to growth (see Pritchett  (1999) and World Bank (2004)).  
   5
are substantially different. Second, these studies do not always account for the 
simultaneous relationships between public investment and capital, private capital 
formation, and other variables like output growth, relative prices, and private sector 
credit.  Third, the treatment of dynamics in these studies is sometimes crude if not 
inexistent.  All three issues are addressed in this paper, which assesses 
quantitatively the impact of public infrastructure on private capital formation in three 
MENA countries: Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief 
overview of direct and indirect channels through which public infrastructure (flows 
and stocks) may affect private investment. Section III describes the vector 
autoregression (VAR) model that we use to assess the links between public 
infrastructure and private capital formation. Section IV examines the data and the 
construction of our quality measures of the public capital stock in infrastructure. 
Estimation results and variance decompositions are discussed in Section V. In 
Section VI impulse response functions are computed to assess the dynamic effects 
of a shock to public infrastructure expenditure and the public infrastructure capital 
stock. The last section draws together some policy implications of our analysis. 
 
II. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT: 
TRANSMISSION CHANNELS  
 
Public infrastructure investment and capital can affect private investment 
through various channels. For the purpose of this study, and given the empirical 
technique that we use later on, it is convenient to classify these channels into two 
broad sets of effects: complementarity and crowding-out effects, and output and 
relative price effects.  
 
1.  Complementarity and Crowding-Out Effects 
 
The complementarity effect asserts that public capital (as opposed to public 
investment) in infrastructure may stimulate private physical capital formation because   6
of its impact on private activity. By raising the marginal productivity of private inputs 
(both labor and capital), it raises the perceived rate of return on, and increases the 
demand for, physical capital by the private sector.
3    Alternatively, a complementarity 
effect between public capital in infrastructure and private investment may operate 
through adjustment costs. This idea, formalized for instance by Turnovsky (1996) in a 
growth context, is based on the view that the availability (and quality) of public capital 
in infrastructure affects some of the costs that firms may incur when investing. For 
instance, a better road network may reduce expenses associated with the 
construction of a new factory or the transportation of heavy equipment. In large 
countries, the impact on unit production costs and the productivity of private capital 
can be substantial (Cohen and Paul (2004)). By lowering production costs and raising 
the expected rate of return, public capital in infrastructure may have a strong impact 
on private capital formation. 
 
Of course, the positive effect of public capital on the marginal productivity of 
private inputs may hold not only for infrastructure but also for public capital in 
education and health, which may enhance the productivity of labor. Other 
components of current public spending, related for instance to the enforcement of 
property rights, can also increase the productivity of the economy and exert a positive 
indirect effect on private investment. But infrastructure capital may have a particularly 
large effect in countries where initial stocks are low and basic infrastructure services 
(electricity and communications, for instance) are lacking. 
 
Nevertheless, to the extent that public investment in infrastructure displaces or 
crowds out private investment, its net positive impact on private capital formation can 
be highly mitigated. Such crowding-out effects tend to occur if the public sector 
finances the increase in public investment through an increase in distortionary taxes--
which may increase incentives for private agents to evade taxation, or reduce the 
                                                 
3Greater availability of public capital in infrastructure could in principle also reduce the demand for 
private inputs, at a given level of output (net substitution effect). But if inputs are gross complements 
(as is the case in general), higher availability of public capital will always increase the marginal 
productivity of private inputs. Moreover, public and private physical capital are likely to have a high 
degree of complementarity, that is, a small elasticity of (net) substitution.   7
expected net rate of return to private capital, and therefore the propensity to invest. A 
similar effect on private capital formation may occur if the increase in public 
infrastructure investment is paid for by borrowing on domestic financial markets, as a 
result of either higher domestic interest rates (in countries where market forces are 
relatively free to operate) or a greater incidence of rationing of credit to the private 
sector.
4 Moreover, if an investment-induced expansion in public borrowing raises 
concerns about the sustainability of public debt over time (that is, the perceived risk 
of default), and strengthens expectations of a future increase in taxation, the risk 
premium embedded in interest rates may increase.
5  By raising the cost of capital 
and negatively affecting expected after-tax rates of return on private capital, this 
increase may have a compounding effect on private investment. Private investors 
may revise downward their investment plans because of anticipated hikes in tax rates 
to cover the increase in government investment. 
 
2.  Indirect Output and Relative Price Effects 
 
  Public investment and capital in infrastructure may also affect private capital 
formation indirectly, through changes in output and relative prices. As noted earlier, 
public capital in infrastructure may increase the marginal productivity of existing 
factor inputs (both capital and labor), thereby lowering marginal production costs and 
increasing the level of private production. In turn, this scale effect on output may lead, 
through the standard accelerator effect, to higher private investment (see Chirinko 
(1993)).  Moreover, if there are externalities associated with the use of some 
production factors (for instance, learning-by-doing effects resulting from a high 
degree of complementarity between physical capital and skilled labor), a positive 
growth effect may also result. An improvement in the stock of public capital in 
                                                 
4Note that any component of government expenditure (not only infrastructure investment), as long 
as it is financed through domestic borrowing, may lower private investment by driving interest rates up 
or increasing the incidence of credit rationing. 
5In a small open economy with open capital markets facing a fixed world interest rate, crowding-
out effects through a rise in domestic interest rates cannot occur. But for small developing countries, 
the supply curve of foreign capital is upward-sloping rather than horizontal. In such conditions, and if 
the risk premium faced on world capital markets is positively related to the debt-to-GDP ratio, an 
increase in domestic public debt induced by a rise in public investment in infrastructure may lead to 
both lower credit to the private sector and higher domestic interest rates.   8
infrastructure may therefore affect the rate of total factor productivity growth, 
independently of its effect on private capital accumulation. 
 
Public infrastructure can also affect private investment indirectly through its 
“flow” effect on the price of domestic consumption goods relative to the price of 
imported goods, that is, the (consumption-based) real exchange rate. An increase in 
public investment in infrastructure for instance will raise aggregate demand and 
domestic prices (in addition to stimulating output). If the nominal exchange rate does 
not depreciate fully to offset the increase in domestic prices, the domestic-currency 
price of imported consumption goods will fall in relative terms (that is, the real 
exchange rate will appreciate), thereby stimulating demand for these goods and 
dampening domestic activity. The net effect on output may be positive or negative, 
depending on the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
imported goods. If this elasticity is low (as one would expect in the short run), the net 
effect on output may be positive, so that private investment may indeed increase. At 
the same time, to the extent that the increase in government spending on 
infrastructure raises the price of domestic capital goods, and the switch in private 
consumption demand toward imports translates into a nominal appreciation, the 
domestic-currency price of imported capital goods will fall in relative terms, resulting 
in a drop in the user cost of capital and an increase in private investment. This 
relative price effect may be particularly important in developing countries where a 
large fraction of capital goods used by the private sector are imported. 
 
In addition to these effects changes in domestic prices and the real exchange 
rate induced by an increase in the flow of public investment in infrastructure may 
affect private investment through both demand- and supply-side effects on output. 
On the demand side, the increase in domestic prices may lower private sector real 
wealth and thus expenditure; if this effect is sufficiently large (relative to the increase 
in public spending) to entail a fall in domestic absorption, firms may revise their 
expectations of future demand and lower investment outlays, through a “reverse” 
accelerator effect. On the supply side, the real appreciation may lead to a shift in 
resource allocation toward the nontradable goods sector, thereby stimulating   9
investment in that sector and depressing capital formation in the tradable goods 
sector. The net effect may be a lower growth rate of output, and thus lower 
investment as a result of an expected reduction in demand growth. At the same time, 
however, if the nominal exchange rate is flexible, and if it does not depreciate fully in 
response to the increase in domestic prices (as a result of an increase in the demand 
for imported goods, for instance), the real cost of imported intermediate inputs may 
fall—thereby stimulating output and private investment. 
 
  It is important to note that both the direction and the strength of the various 
effects described above can vary over time and depend to a very large extent on the 
environment in which private investors are operating. For instance, the relationship 
between public and private investment may be one of substitution in the short run, 
and one of complementarity in the long run, depending on how productive public 
investment is. That is, in the short term, the crowding-out effect may predominate 
(because the pool of resources available to finance public and private investment is 
limited), whereas the complementarity effect may prevail in the long term, as a result 
of strong supply-side effects. Thus, using dynamic models is essential to study the 
relationship between public infrastructure and private capital formation, beyond the 
need to account for gestation lags. At the same time, it is important to control for 
indirect effects that operate through changes in output, the real exchange rate, and 
possibly interest rates or credit.  
 
  Finally, it I also worth noting that there may be a feedback effect through 
public investment itself; indeed, to the extent that the rise in private investment 
stimulates output and leads to higher tax revenue, public investment may increase 
further, as a consequence of the additional resources at the disposal of the public 
sector. These dynamic and feedback effects are key reasons for choosing a VAR 
framework for our empirical analysis, as discussed next.   10
 
III.  VAR SPECIFICATION 
 
  The foregoing discussion suggests that it is important, in assessing the link 
between public infrastructure and private investment, to account for both the flow and 
stock of public infrastructure, and to control for simultaneous interactions between 
these variables and output, the real exchange rate, and financial variables (either 
interest rates or private sector credit).  Accordingly, we opted to use a VAR approach 
to study the relationship between public investment and private capital formation in 
MENA. VAR models offer a number of advantages over the specification and 
estimation of a structural model. First, in developing countries in general, it has 
proved difficult to estimate robust structural models of private investment (see Agénor 
(2004)). VAR models offer a way of analyzing the dynamic relationship between our 
two main variables without having to fully specify a structural model of private capital 
formation. The lumpy nature of much infrastructure investment implies that the full 
impact of investment in, say, roads or telecommunications, may be felt only after 
several years; VAR models allow us to take into account delayed responses with a 
parsimonious lag structure. Second, VAR models explicitly recognize the 
endogeneity of public infrastructure investment and capital—which may result, as 
noted above, from the feedback effect of private investment on output (through tax 
revenue). Third, VAR models provide a convenient common framework for examining 
investment behavior in a cross-country study. Using a uniform single regression 
model would amount to imposing strong restrictions on specification and the direction 
of causality among the variables. As a result, models of this type tend to be prone to 
misspecification errors resulting from “missing variables” bias and the neglect of 
dynamic feedbacks—a particularly important problem when the purpose of the study 
is to conduct simulation experiments. 
 
  The use of VAR models to study the impact of public investment on private 
capital formation is by no means new. For instance, Mittnik and Neumann (2001) 
examined the impact of public investment using impulse response functions derived 
from a VAR consisting of public investment, private investment, public consumption,   11
and output. Ghali (1998) used a VAR (or, more precisely, a vector error correction 
model) with real GDP, public investment, and private investment. Ligthart (2000) 
used an unrestricted VAR in output, public capital, private capital, and employment 
for Portugal. Belloc and Vertova (2004), using a vector error-correction approach, 
found a complementarity relationship between public and private investment, and a 
positive effect of investment on output in 6 out of 7 highly-indebted poor countries. 
Finally, Voss (2002) specified a VAR with ratios of public and private investment to 
GDP, the growth rates of the relative prices of public and private investment goods, 
the real interest rate, and the growth rate of GDP. All these studies, however, suffer 
from three major limitations in terms of their specification: a) they do not generally 
make a distinction between the flow of public investment and the stock of public 
capital; b) and they do no always account for potential crowding-out effects; and c) 
they do no account for indirect effects of public investment on private capital 
formation through the real exchange rate. Belloc and Vertova (2004), for instance, 
used a trivariate VAR, with no control for factors other than output. As emphasized 
earlier, the channels through which public infrastructure affects private investment 
involve both “flow” effects (which operate through aggregate demand, relative prices, 
and the financial sector) and “stock” effects (which operate both through the demand 
and the supply sides). 
 
Our VAR improves on existing studies in all three respects. We include the 
following variables in our specification: the flow of public capital expenditure on 
infrastructure as a share of GDP, the stock of public capital in infrastructure as a 
share of GDP, private capital formation as a share of GDP, the ratio of private sector 
credit to GDP, real GDP growth, and the real exchange rate. The actual growth rate 
of output is used as a proxy for expected changes in aggregate demand and 
captures dynamics associated with the accelerator effect. Changes in private sector 
credit account for possible crowding-out effects associated with government 
spending through changes in credit rationing.  We chose a credit variable instead of 
Interest rates, because these rates remained largely under government control for   12
much of the estimation period.
6 Changes in the real exchange rate account for both 
the relative price effect of an increase in domestic absorption, and indirect effects on 
the user cost of capital and the price of imported inputs, as discussed earlier.
7  
 
To assess whether the stock of public capital in infrastructure should be included 
in the VAR (in addition to the associated flow), we performed an exogeneity test 
based on estimating both the “unrestricted” and “restricted” VAR models (that is, with 
and without the public capital stock).
8 Finally, to calculate variance decompositions 
and identify impulse response functions, we use the standard Choleski 
decomposition. Specifically, to implement this decomposition, the disturbances in the 
model are assumed to follow the following causal ordering: credit-to-GDP ratio; public 
infrastructure spending ratio; public infrastructure capital ratio; the rate of change of 
the real exchange rate; the growth rate of GDP; and the private investment ratio. The 
reasoning behind this ordering structure is that whereas public expenditure decisions 
or the public capital stock can affect private sector investment decisions in the short 
run (within one period), the reverse is not true. Thus, public expenditure on 
infrastructure does not depend contemporaneously on private investment, an 
assumption which we take to be consistent with treating public investment as 
exogenous (at least with respect to private investment) in structural models. Public 
expenditure on infrastructure naturally precedes the public capital stock. By contrast, 
the real exchange rate, private investment, and output growth, are all assumed to 
respond immediately (within a year) to public investment. Private sector credit is 
                                                 
6Mansouri (2004), in his study on Morocco, uses the real deposit rate as a proxy for the cost of 
borrowing. However, this is a debatable assumption, given that official nominal interest rates remained 
under control during much of his estimation period. 
7In principle, we should use changes in the ratio of the price of imported investment goods to the 
domestic price of these goods (or the national accounts deflator of private investment), as for instance 
in Mansouri (2004). However, sufficiently long time series were not available for our sample. 
8Let ΩU and ΩC denote the variance-covariance matrices of the residuals associated with the 
unrestricted and restricted models, respectively, and define the likelihood ratio statistic, λ, as  
λ = (T-c) (log|ΩC| - log|ΩU|), 
where |ΩC| (respectively |ΩU|) is the determinant of ΩC (respectively ΩU), T  the number of 
observations, and c the number of parameters (equal to the number of lags times the number of 
variables, plus one for the constant term) estimated in each equation of the unrestricted system. This 
statistic has a χ
2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions in the system, 
which is in turn equal to one times the number of lags.   13
considered the most “exogenous” variable, with the implicit view being that it is 
largely under the control of (risk-averse) banks.  
 
IV.  THE DATA 
 
We begin by examining the data on private and public investment in the three 
countries in our sample. Next, we consider the evolution of public capital expenditure 
on infrastructure and describe how these flows are converted into stocks. We then 
explain how our basic indicators of the quality of public capital in infrastructure are 
constructed, and how they are used to derive a composite indicator. 
 
1.  Overall Trends 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of public and private investment ratios to GDP 
since the mid-1960s in Egypt, the mid-1970s in Jordan, and the early 1970s in 
Tunisia. The share of public investment in GDP has displayed substantial volatility 
over time in all three countries, but has been on a downward trend in Egypt and 
Jordan since the late 1980s. Private investment ratios have at the same time been 
subject to large fluctuations, most significantly during the 1980s and 1990s—a period 
characterized also by large fluctuations in GDP in the region as a whole. In Egypt, 
following a steady increase from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, the share of private 
investment in GDP has averaged 10 percent. In Jordan and Tunisia, private 
investment ratios have declined significantly since the peaks of the early 1990s, 
fluctuating in recent years between 12 and 15 percent. 
 
2.  Flows and Stocks of Public Infrastructure 
 
National Accounts data on public investment in infrastructure are generally not 
available. For the purpose of our study, we used government budget data published 
in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) Yearbook to build an estimate. 
Specifically, as discussed in Appendix B, we calculated capital expenditure on 
infrastructure by adding capital outlays on various categories, including construction,   14
transportation, and communication. Of course, all capital expenditures on these 
categories do not necessarily represent “investment”, as conventionally defined; 
some components of these outlays may be related to maintenance operations. 
However, we did not have sufficient information to refine the GFS estimates. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of total capital expenditure in proportion of GDP, 
and capital expenditure on infrastructure both as a share of total public expenditure 
(including current spending) and as a share of total capital expenditure only. The 
figure shows a declining trend in all three ratios since the early 1980s for Jordan and 
the late 1980s for Tunisia. For all three countries, the behavior of the ratio of total 
capital expenditure to GDP is consistent with the evolution of total public investment 
displayed in Figure 1. As a proportion of total capital outlays, the share of capital 
expenditure on infrastructure has averaged 30 percent for Jordan and almost 40 
percent for Tunisia in recent years. For Egypt, by contrast, there are large 
fluctuations during the past 40 years, but no clear trends. In recent years, the share 
of capital expenditure on infrastructure in total capital outlays has fluctuated between 
45 and 50 percent. 
 
Using our flow data on infrastructure spending, we calculated the stock of 
public capital in infrastructure, using the perpetual inventory method and the GDP 
deflator to estimate real values in constant local prices. This procedure is, of course, 
subject to limitations.
9 Differences in the efficiency of the public sector and the price 
of infrastructure capital, in particular, means that the same level of capital spending 
on infrastructure may yield very different results across countries. We account for 
quality ex post by using various indicators, as discussed below. More generally, the 
use of perpetual inventory methods to calculate stocks from expenditure flows may 
introduce systematic errors in stock estimates. At the same time, however, it should 
be noted that adequate price variables for public infrastructure are difficult to 
                                                 
9See Hulten (1990) for a detailed discussion of the conceptual and measurement problems 
involved in constructing capital series. To calculate the public capital stock, we used a uniform 
depreciation rate of 2.5 percent.  By comparison, Nehru and Dhaneswar (1993) used a uniform rate of 
4 percent, whereas Larson et al. (2000) use alternative values of 4 and 6 percent, to estimate 
aggregate stocks of capital. However, sensitivity analysis showed that our empirical results are not 
unduly sensitive to our particular choice.   15
construct (given that infrastructure services are often provided free of charge) and 
that errors in estimating initial stocks (a common problem with this methodology) tend 
to become less significant over time. In addition, the alternative of using actual stocks 
of infrastructure (such as roads, electricity production, or water supply) was not 
feasible due to lack of data; the only complete series that we had at our disposal was 
that of electricity production, but it was felt that using it as a the sole indicator of 
quality of the overall stock of infrastructure was not warranted. 
 
3.  Quality Indicators  
 
In assessing the impact of the public capital stock in infrastructure on private 
investment, it is important to account not only for the absolute amount of that stock, 
but also for the quality (or efficiency) with which public capital is used.
10 A common 
procedure to estimating the quality of public infrastructure capital is to calculate the 
index proposed by Hulten (1996). His composite measure of public capital efficiency 
is based on four basic indicators: mainline faults per 100 telephone calls for 
telecommunications; electricity generation losses as a percent of total electricity 
output; the percentage of paved roads in good condition; and diesel locomotive 
utilization as a percentage of the total rolling stock.  In practice, researchers have 
found that these individual quality indicators tend to be highly correlated with the 
quantities of each type of infrastructure.
11 Thus, much of the variation in infrastructure 
quality may be well captured by variations in its quantity. 
 
The individual quality indicators proposed by Hulten (1996) are subject to 
limitations. For instance, electric power losses include both “technical” losses, 
reflecting the quality of the power grid, and theft; in general, the breakdown between 
                                                 
10According to the World Bank (1994, p. 1), technical inefficiencies in roads, railways, power, and 
water in developing countries caused losses equivalent to a quarter of their annual investment in 
infrastructure in the early 1990s. See Estache (2004) for a further discussion. 
11Calderón and Servén (2004a, p. 19) found a high degree of correlation between the individual 
quality indicators listed above with the related quantities of infrastructure (that is, between power 
generation capacity and power losses, or between road density and road quality, the latter measured 
by the proportion of paved roads in total). In a companion study (Calderón and Servén (2994b, p. 11)) 
they obtain the same result with their two synthetic indicators of quantity and quality of infrastructure.   16
the two components is not available. Moreover, these series tend to fluctuate 
significantly over time, and these fluctuations are not always easy to interpret as 
changes in quality as opposed to, say, measurement errors or “abnormal” shocks. 
More importantly in the present case, these indicators were not all available for our 
group of countries, and when they were, many data points were missing. Despite 
using a combination of local and international sources—including the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and Canning’s (1998) database on 
physical infrastructure stocks—we were unable to “piece together” complete series. 
 
We therefore followed another approach, which consisted in, first, defining two 
alternative quality indicators and, second, combining them to create a composite 
indicator. Our first individual indicator is an “ICOR-based” measure. Aggregate 
ICORs (calculated as the ratio of total domestic investment divided by the change in 
output) are commonly viewed as a measure of the efficiency of investment. Here we 
apply this idea to public infrastructure, by calculating an ICOR coefficient defined as 
public capital expenditure on infrastructure divided by the change in GDP.  We then 
invert this measure and take a 3-year moving average, in order to smooth out the 
behavior of the series over time. Figure 3 shows the behavior of our ICOR-based 
quality indicator. The results suggest that whereas quality seems to have improved in 
recent years in Tunisia, it has deteriorated in Egypt and Jordan.  
 
  Our second indicator is an “excess demand” measure. Our premise is that, if 
growth in the demand for infrastructure services tends to exceed growth in supply, 
pressure on the existing public capital stock will intensify and quality will deteriorate. 
To construct these indicators we proceeded in two steps. First, we calculated 
individual indicators of “excess demand” for three categories of infrastructure 
services: electricity; telephone mainlines; and paved roads. To estimate demand for 
infrastructure service h, we applied the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita to 
the stock of public capital in h at the base period. We used elasticity values of unity in 
                                                                                                                                                          
Esfahani and Ramírez (2003, p. 446) also note the existence of a close correlation between stocks of 
infrastructure capital and quality in their sample.   17
each case.
12 To estimate supply of infrastructure service h, we used the actual stock 
of h. We then calculated individual indicators of excess demand for each component 
of infrastructure services by taking the ratio of supply to “predicted” demand. This 
ratio gives therefore an indicator of adequacy between supply and demand; a fall in 
the ratio would indicate excessive pressure on existing infrastructure and therefore a 
deterioration in quality. Second, we calculated a “composite” excess demand 
indicator for each country. To do so we used the same procedure used by Hulten 
(1996) to calculate his quality index, that is, we standardized each of the three series 
(by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard error) and calculated the 
unweighted, arithmetic average of the standardized series.  
 
Continuous annual time series for all three of the infrastructure services 
referred to earlier were not available for the whole estimation period. For instance, 
data on roads (in terms of kilometers per capita) were available only since 1990. We 
therefore calculated the composite indicator with all the information available in the 
base period to begin with, and added additional series as they became available. 
Figure 4 shows the behavior of these series, which have been normalized to a value 
of unity in 1977, to facilitate comparisons across countries. Again, a three-year 
moving average is used, in order to smooth out spikes possibly associated to 
measurement errors. In contrast to our ICOR-based indicator, the results appear to 
suggest that quality improved in all three countries in recent years. 
 
Differences in the behavior of our two quality indicators may appear 
problematic, given that there is no strong a priori reason for choosing among them.  
We thus follow the same approach as Calderón and Servén (2004b), who define 
several standard quality indicators (based on electricity losses, percentage of paved 
roads, and telephone faults, given that they use stocks of electricity, roads, and 
                                                 
12In their estimation of demand functions for infrastructure services based on panel data, Fay and 
Yepes (2003, p. 8) found long-term elasticities of 0.375 for electricity, 0.5 for telephone mainlines, and 
0.14 for paved roads. These estimates differ quite significantly from our values of unity. However, the 
Fay-Yepes estimates refer to low- and middle-income countries in general, so there is no indication 
that they are adequate for MENA countries in particular—or, for that matter, the three countries in our 
sample. Moreover, in their regressions, there is no price (or user cost) variable, so their estimated 
income elasticities may be biased.    18
telephones in their regressions) and use principal components analysis to 
"summarize" the information contained in all of these series. Specifically, we applied 
principal components analysis to the two quality series that we defined earlier.
13 The 
results show that the first principal component explains 64 percent of the total 
variance of the underlying variables for Egypt, 68 percent for Jordan, and 55 percent 
for Tunisia.  After renormalization, we use a weighted average of the two principal 
components, using as weights the proportion of total variance explained by each 
component, as our quality indicator.  
 
V.  ESTIMATION AND VARIANCE DECOMPOSITIONS 
 
As noted earlier, our VAR model consists of public capital expenditure on 
infrastructure as a share of GDP; private investment as a share of GDP; the growth 
rate of real GDP; the ratio of private sector credit to GDP; the rate of change of the 
real exchange rate; and possibly the public capital stock in infrastructure. Prior to 
estimation, we examined the stationarity properties of each of these variables with 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests. The results (which are 
available upon request) indicated that all series are either stationary or trend 
stationary. As a result, we included an exogenous time trend in the VAR. 
 
The first step in the estimation was to verify that the public capital stock in 
infrastructure “belongs” to the VAR. To do so we applied the exogeneity test 
described earlier. The results indicated that the null hypothesis (exclusion of the 
public capital stock from the VAR) was soundly rejected by the likelihood ratio test. 
We then chose the optimal lag length, using the Akaike criterion. Given the relatively 
small size of the sample, we were able to compare models with only one and two 
lags.
14 The Akaike criterion suggested a lag of 2 years for Egypt, and one year for 
                                                 
13See, for instance, Jackson (1991) for a description of principal components analysis. The first 
step in this analysis is to put all of the data in standard units. By doing so, all of the transformed 
variables have unit variances and the resulting covariance matrix is actually the correlation matrix of 
the original variables. 
14Specifying a maximum lag length that is too short may impose unwarranted zero restrictions. At 
the same time, imposing a lag length that is too long may result in inefficient parameter estimates, 
because the model is over-parameterized.   19
Jordan and Tunisia. Lags of this order may not be sufficient to properly account for 
long gestation periods associated with some types of public investment, but the lack 
of degrees of freedom prevented us from experimenting with higher-order systems. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that we introduce explicitly the stock of capital in 
infrastructure itself, and that our hypothesis is that the (quality-adjusted) stock 
produces a proportional flow of services. Simulations related to changes in the public 
capital stock are therefore unaffected by the problem of gestation lags. 
 
The extent to which exogenous changes (or innovations) in public 
infrastructure and other variables in the VAR model have affected the behavior of 
private capital formation can be gauged by computing the proportion of the variance 
of the forecast error for the private investment-to-GDP ratio that can be attributed to 
variations in each variable at different forecast horizons. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show 
these variance decompositions, at a horizon of up to 24 periods. For Egypt, although 
shocks to the private investment ratio account for a large fraction (almost 64 percent) 
of its variance in the short run, in the long run it explains only 11 percent. The fraction 
explained by the credit-to-GDP ratio, by contrast, increases from about 4 percent in 
the short term to 24 percent in the long term. So does the share of public capital 
spending on infrastructure, whose share rises from 1 percent to almost 28 percent. 
By contrast, the share of public capital remains relatively stable over time, at about 8-
9 percent. For Jordan, the credit-to-GDP ratio also plays an important role in 
explaining the variability of the private investment ratio; it accounts for 62 percent in 
the short term, and 52 percent in the long term. Public spending on infrastructure and 
public capital play a much less significant role than in Egypt, explaining only about 8 
percent of the variance of private investment in the long term. But real exchange rate 
shocks have a much larger impact than in Egypt, accounting for about a quarter of 
the variance of private investment in the long term. For Tunisia, the credit-to-GDP 
ratio appears to play a negligible role; in both the short and the long term, it explains 
barely 3 percent of variations in the private investment ratio. Public expenditure on 
infrastructure and public capital, by contrast, explain about a third of these 
fluctuations in the long term. Shocks to private investment itself explain a large 
fraction of the variance of that variable, even in the long term. Overall, therefore, the   20
variance decompositions suggest that public spending on infrastructure and public 
capital account for only a small fraction of the variance of private investment in 
Jordan, and not much more than a third of this variance for Egypt and Tunisia. Other 
shocks, as well as “own” innovations, appear to have mattered a lot more. 
 
VI.  IMPULSE RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
 
We now examine the impulse response functions associated with a shock to 
public spending on infrastructure and our quality-adjusted measure of public capital. 
As noted earlier, this analysis is important because it allows us to assess to what 
extent flows and stocks of public infrastructure affect private investment, taking into 
account crowding-out effects and the possibility that indirect effects may occur 
through changes in the growth rate of output and the real exchange rate. 
 
1.  Shock to Public Spending on Infrastructure 
 
The left-hand side of Figure 8 shows the response over a 10-year horizon of 
the private investment rate to a one-standard deviation innovation in the ratio of 
public capital expenditure on infrastructure in GDP. The solid lines in the figure 
represent the impulse response functions themselves, whereas the dotted lines are 
the associated 95 percent upper and lower confidence bands.
15  
 
The results indicate that the shock to the public capital expenditure ratio has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the private investment rate beginning in 
period 2 and lasting for 2 periods in Egypt, and no effect in Jordan and Tunisia. 
Moreover, in the case of Egypt and Jordan, the shock has no effect on the growth 
rate of output, the real exchange rate, or the credit ratio. By contrast, in the case of 
Tunisia, the real exchange rate appreciates and output falls significantly in the 
second period. Thus, the lack of significance of a public spending shock on private 
investment in Tunisia may result from the fact that the resulting increase in aggregate   21
demand (which tends to raise domestic prices) is offset by an adverse real wealth 
effect on private consumption expenditure, at the same time that the real appreciation 
leads to a contraction in output. In turn, this contraction in activity may offset the initial 
positive impact of public expenditure on private investment through a “reverse” 
accelerator effect. 
 
2.  Shock to Public Capital in Infrastructure 
 
  The right-hand side of Figure 8 displays the response of the private investment 
ratio to a one-standard deviation innovation in the ratio of public infrastructure capital 
to GDP. The results show that the shock has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on private capital formation in the first two periods for Egypt and Tunisia. In the 
case of Jordan, the effect is significant only in the second period. Moreover, in the 
case of Egypt, the growth rate of output increases significantly in the first 3 periods, 
which seems to occur without any significant pressure on domestic prices (and thus 
no tendency for the real exchange rate to appreciate); thus, the rise in the investment 
ratio may also reflect an indirect accelerator effect. 
 
Overall, therefore, our results indicate that there are significant, albeit relatively 
small in absolute terms and short-lived, "flow" and "stock" effects of public 
infrastructure on private investment in Egypt, and a significant "stock" effect in Jordan 
and Tunisia, with no evidence of a "flow" effect. To assess whether the increase in 
the quality-adjusted infrastructure public capital stock reflects an increase in the stock 
itself (that is, the “raw” quantity of capital) or a change in quality, we reestimated the 
VAR model for each country with the unadjusted capital stock. The results showed no 
significant effects associated with an innovation in the capital stock in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Moreover, in the case of Jordan, the private investment ratio actually fell 
slightly on impact. Our interpretation of these results is thus that quality matters for all 
three countries. Increasing the quantity of infrastructure, by itself, does not have a 
significant effect on the ratio of private investment to output. 
                                                                                                                                                          
15The impulse responses and their associated confidence intervals are computed using Monte 
Carlo simulations employing 1,000 draws. A complete set of results for all the variables in the VAR   22
 
VII.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our empirical results have useful policy implications not only for the three 
countries in our sample but for the MENA region in general. As concluded in a recent 
report by the World Bank (2004), stimulating growth and job creation in MENA will 
require comprehensive policy reforms. A key issue in this context, as noted earlier, is 
the role of the public sector, including in investment provision and institution building. 
We view our study as bringing to the fore two main policy messages: the first is that 
the quality of public investment, and specifically infrastructure, matters. The second is 
that the weak effect of public capital on private investment may reflect the fact that 
the complementarity effect, while potentially important, may not “kick in” because of 
an unfavorable environment for private sector activity. 
 
Regarding the first message, an implication of our results is indeed that it may 
be more important, in some countries, to improve the quality  of the existing 
infrastructure than to engage in further investment. Reducing unproductive public 
capital expenditure and improving quality must be accompanied by policy reforms 
aimed at limiting investment to infrastructure capital that crowds in the private sector 
and/or corrects for fundamental market failures.
16 To do so requires redefining the 
role of the public sector as a catalyst, rather than a provider, of the majority of 
infrastructure services. This will entail privatization and greater involvement of the 
private sector in infrastructure investment. Such involvement will allow commercial 
discipline to be introduced in the delivery of services, thereby improving efficiency 
and the quality and coverage of services, lowering costs, and reducing the burden on 
the public budget. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
model are available upon request. 
16The existence of market failures is not, of course, an automatic justification for government 
involvement; such failures only provide a presumption of the need for government intervention. 
Moreover, even when it is required or desirable, intervention can take many forms; direct public 
provision is only one of them, and not necessarily the best one. In practice, one has to take into 
account possible government failures, and compare the costs and benefits of both options.   23
Private sector involvement in the delivery of basic infrastructure has indeed 
increased in developing countries. According to a comprehensive report by the 
International Finance Corporation (2003), during the 1990s, more than 130 
developing countries pursued (through a variety of schemes) private participation in 
that sector. During the period 1990-2001, for developing countries in general, private 
participation accounted for 25 percent of total investment in infrastructure. However, 
the same report notes that in MENA investment in infrastructure projects with private 
participation fell (in 2001 US dollars) from 3.6 billion in 1993 to $2.8 billion in 2001. 
Cumulative investment in the region for the period 1990-2001 (again, in 2001 US 
dollars) amounted to $22.8 billion, which was less than in Sub-Saharan Africa ($23.4 
billion) and South Asia ($39.6 billion), and even more so compared to East Asia and 
the Pacific ($210.6 billion), Europe and Central Asia ($97.1 billion), and Latin America 
and the Caribbean ($360.6 billion).
17  
 
  The second policy message of our study is that the lack of a strong effect of 
public infrastructure on private investment may reflect the unfavorable environment in 
which the private sector has operated in the region. Indeed, a key conclusion of 
recent research by the World Bank (2003b) is that the unfavorable investment 
environment in MENA goes a long way toward accounting for the lack of a strong 
response from the private sector in the last decade. While infrastructure (in the form 
of the provision of critical telecommunications, transport, and energy services) is 
important, other improvements in the environment in which domestic investment is 
conducted are crucial. These include, inter alia, the need to provide financing on 
adequate terms, and guarantee a secure and efficient judicial system. Without 
renewed effort to tackle these issues, private investment may not achieve its potential 
to stimulate growth and job creation in the region. 
 
                                                 
17In MENA as elsewhere, a large share of these investments focused on telecommunications (44 
percent for all developing countries) and electricity (28 percent). See International Finance Corporation 
(2003) Harris (2003), and Kessides (2004), for more details.   24
Appendix A 
Public Investment and Private Capital Formation: 
Some Recent Evidence 
 
A number of recent studies have attempted to assess empirically the link 
between public investment and private capital formation, in addition to those related 
to MENA countries cited in the introduction. This Appendix provides a brief summary 
of the main results of these studies. 
  
A first group of studies focused on the link between total public investment and 
private investment, using both individual-country based regressions (in some cases 
based on cointegration techniques) and dynamic panel regressions.
18 Examples of 
regression models include Akkina and Celebi (2002), Apergis (2000), Erenburg and 
Wohar (1995), Ibrahim (2001), Laopodis (2001), Dhumale (2000), Ramírez (2000), 
and Narayan (2004). For instance, Apergis (2000), using cointegration techniques, 
found that the relationship between public and private investment in Greece was 
positive during the period 1948-80 but negative during the period 1981-86. The latter 
sample coincided with a period during which the share of public investment in total 
investment increased sharply. in a study of 8 Latin American countries during the 
period 1980-95, Ramírez (2000) found that public investment expenditure had a 
positive (albeit lagged) effect on private capital formation, suggesting a “crowding in” 
effect. Narayan (2004), using a bivariate framework, found that public and private 
investment were cointegrated in Fiji during the period 1950-75; in the long run, a 1 
percent increase in government investment led to an increase in private investment 
of between1.1 and 1.6 percent. 
 
Panel studies focusing on the link between total public investment and private 
investment include Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Ghura and Goodwin (2000), Miller 
and Tsoukis (2001), and Everhart and Sumlinski (2001). For instance, Ghura and 
Goodwin (2000), using panel regression techniques, studied the determinants of 
private investment in a group of 31 countries in Asia, Latin America, and sub-
Saharan Africa.  They found that while total public investment had a positive and 
significant impact on private capital formation in sub-Saharan Africa, it had the 
opposite effect in Asia and Latin America. Similar results were obtained by Everhart 
and Sumlinski (2001), using a broader sample.  
 
Another group of studies have attempted to quantify the effects of various 
components  of public investment on private capital formation. A first set of 
contributions in that literature has focused on the effects of changes in public capital 
in infrastructure on factor demand and output (and thus indirectly on private 
investment, assuming that the accelerator effect is sufficiently strong). For instance, 
Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000) found that public infrastructure capital has a 
significant and positive effect on the demand for private inputs and the supply of 
output in a sample of 12 industrialized countries. The elasticity of output with respect 
to public capital ranges from 0.4 for the United Kingdom to about 2 for Norway, with 
                                                 
18A third technique is vector autoregression models, which is discussed in the text.   25
estimates of about 1 for the United States and 0.5 for Japan. Similar elasticities for 
other countries are scarce, and usually focus on total public capital. Ligthart (2000), 
for instance, found an elasticity of output with respect to public capital of about 0.4 for 
Portugal, whereas Naqvi (2003) found that public capital has large positive 
externalities in Pakistan and is significantly more productive than private capital, with 
an output elasticity close to 0.5 (as opposed to 0.3 for private capital).  
 
A second set of contributions has focused more directly on the effects of 
components of public investment on private capital formation. Ahmed and Miller 
(2000), using a sample of 39 industrial and developing countries for the period 1975-
84, found that expenditure on social security and welfare reduces private investment 
(through crowding out effects) in both groups of countries, whereas expenditure on 
transport and communication raises aggregate investment in developing countries. In 
a contribution focusing on Latin America, Calderón and Servén (2002) argued that 
the lack of investment in infrastructure (most notably in roads, telecommunications, 
and power generation capacity) relative to other developing regions during the past 
two decades had an adverse effect on productivity, production costs, and investment 
by the private sector, and dampened output growth in the region. Pereira (2000), 
using a breakdown of public investment in “core” infrastructure into a) transportation 
(highways and streets), b) electric and gas facilities, transit systems, and airfields; 
and c) sewage and water supply systems, found that in the United States all types of 
public investment have a positive effect on private investment. 
 
Most of these results, based on either individual-country or dynamic panel 
regressions, suffer from two fundamental limitations. First, they do not account 
explicitly for simultaneous interactions between public investment, private investment, 
and other variables such as the real exchange rate. Second, and related to the first 
point, they do not account for the government budget constraint, and therefore 
provide unreliable estimates of the impact of public investment on private capital 
formation. As noted in the first part of the paper, this impact depends very much on 
how the increase in public spending is financed. 
   26
Appendix B 
Data Sources and Definitions 
 
This Appendix provides a brief description of the data used in this study. The 
actual dataset is available upon request. 
 
Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in percent of GDP: For 
Egypt, the data source is International Finance Corporation (IFC) for 1982-99, and 
World Development Indicators (WDI) for 2000-02. For 1965-81, the shares of total 
public and private investment are applied to total fixed capital formation to construct 
the private fixed capital formation investment series. Series on total public and private 
investment for 1965-81 were provided by the Bank’s desk economist. Jordan: The 
data source is WDI. Tunisia: The data source is WDI. 
 
Claims on private sector in percent of GDP: The data source is IFS. 
 
Growth rate of the real effective exchange rate: defined as the log difference of 
the real effective exchange rate. Between 1980-2002, the data source is IFS (1 over 
the IMF definition). Before 1980, the real effective exchange rate is calculated as the 
ratio of the nominal exchange rate times the unit value of imports, to the consumer 
price index. The data source of these variables is IFS and the base year of each 
variable is 1990. The growth rate of this series is used to construct the real effective 
exchange rate series before 1980. 
 
Growth rate of real GDP: defined as the log difference of real GDP, in constant 
1990 local currency units (LCU). The data source is WDI. 
 
Gross fixed capital formation by the public sector in percent of GDP: For 
Egypt, the data source is IFC for 1982-99, and WDI for 2000-02. For 1965-81, the 
shares of total public and private investment are applied to total fixed capital 
formation to construct the public fixed capital formation investment series. Series on 
total public and private investment for 1965-81 were provided by the Bank’s desk 
economist. Jordan: The data source is WDI. Tunisia: The data source is WDI. 
 
Public capital expenditure infrastructure: The data source is the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS). It is obtained by adding the following series: 
mining and mineral resources, manufacturing and construction; fuel and energy; 
railway, air, pipeline, and other transportation; water transport; transportation and 
communication; other transportation and communication; Housing and community 
amenities. This series is deflated by the GDP deflator to calculate a series in constant 
LCU.  
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Public infrastructure capital stock in constant LCU: calculated as INF_K(t) =  
Real public infrastructure expenditure(t-1) + (1-depreciation rate) times INF_K(t-1). 
The depreciation rate is 2.5%. The initial stock is not available and is set to zero.
19 
 
Adjusted public infrastructure capital stock in constant LCU: INF_K series is 
adjusted by multiplying it by the quality index for public infrastructure capital 
investment, normalized at unity in the first period of estimation. 
 
Composite quality index: is the weighted average of the two principal 
components, using as weights the proportion of total variance explained by each 
component. The principal components are calculated over two separate indicators: 
an ICOR-based measure (defined as the average of 1 over ICOR for public 
infrastructure capital investment at period t, t-1, t-2, and t-3, with ICOR itself defined 
as nominal public infrastructure investment divided by the change in nominal GDP) 
and an “excess demand” measure, defined as the average over periods t, t-1, t-2, 
and t-3, of the three individual indicators for the quality of public infrastructure capital 
defined in the text. 
                                                 
19 Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) use three-year averages of investment to estimate the initial 
stock of capital. Larson et al. (2000) estimate the initial level of investment by using a regression of the 
log of investment on time. Both methods, however, are somewhat arbitrary.   28
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Figure 1 
MENA Countries: Public and Private Investment 
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Figure 2 



































































































































































































































Capital Expenditure (GFS) (in % of GDP, left scale)
Share of capital expenditure on infrastructure (in % of total expenditure, left scale)




Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
MENA Countries: Excess Demand Quality Indicator 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
MENA Countries: Response of Private Investment in percent of GDP  
to One Standard Deviation Innovation in Public Spending on Infrastructure or in Public Capital 
Stock in Infrastructure, both in percent of GDP 
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